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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693
(2000) (holding that the lower court erred in concluding that a citizen suit
claim for civil penalties was moot when the defendant, after
commencement of the litigation, came into compliance with its National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit).
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("Laidlaw") bought a facility in
Roebuck, South Carolina which included a wastewater treatment plant.
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
("DHEC") granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The permit
authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water into the North Tygar River,
but limited the discharge of pollutants. Laidlaw began to discharge various
pollutants, particularly mercury, into the river in excess of the permit. In
April 1992, Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups
(collectively "FOE") sent Laidlaw a sixty-day notice letter notifying the
company of their intent to sue. Following receipt of the notice letter,
Laidlaw's lawyer contacted the DHEC to ask whether it would consider
filing a lawsuit against Laidlaw in order to bar FOE's proposed citizen suit
under the CWA. The DHEC agreed and the two entities reached a
settlement requiring Laidlaw to pay $100,000 in civil penalties and to make
"every effort" to comply with permit obligations. The facility later closed.
In June 1992, FOE filed a citizen suit under section 505(a) of the
CWA.
The district court determined injunctive relief inappropriate
because Laidlaw, after the institution of the litigation, achieved substantial
compliance with the terms of its discharge permit. However, the court
assessed a civil penalty of $405,800 and stated that Laidlaw could possibly
obtain attorney's fees. The court found that the total economic benefit to
Laidlaw, because of its extended period of noncompliance, equaled
$1,092,581. The appellate court vacated the district court's order when it
held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw fully complied with the
terms of its permit and FOE failed to appeal the denial of equitable relief.
The appellate court also held that FOE was not entitled to attorney's fees
because they did not receive relief on the merits. The main issues were
whether the case became moot once Laidlaw began to comply with its
permit and whether the plaintiffs had sufficient standing.
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The United States Supreme Court reasoned that Laidlaw's voluntary
cessation of its allegedly unlawful conduct did not suffice to moot the case.
It also found that the appellate court misperceived the remedial potential of
civil penalties. These penalties deter future violations and thereby redress
the injuries to the citizen. Additionally, the closing of the facility did not
moot the case because it was not clear whether it was reasonable to assume
that the permit violations would not recur.
Since the Supreme Court found that the case was not moot, it became
An
necessary to determine whether FOE had Article III standing.
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members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. The
Supreme Court found that individual members who, if not for the pollution
would otherwise use the river, had sufficient standing.
The CWA allows citizens to file suits enforcing NPDES permits.
Citizens lack standing when the violations have ceased prior to the filing of
the complaint. Additionally, the CWA bars a citizen from suing if the
Environmental Protection Agency or the State has already filed suit. The
mercury violations continued after FOE filed the complaint. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court found that the DHEC did not diligently prosecute the
original action against Laidlaw.
The Court reversed and remanded because it found that the case was
not moot and that FOE had sufficient standing.
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UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
waterway was navigable for jurisdictional purposes based on the
waterway's current, not historical use).
LeBlanc and Ossen's kayak collided with a recreational motorboat
operated by Cleveland and owned by Grant on the Hudson River. LeBlanc
and Ossen filed suit in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction
alleging Cleveland and Grant negligently caused the accident and resulting
injuries. Cleveland and Grant then brought third-party complaints against
the business ("JRD") that had rented the kayak to LeBlanc and Ossen.
This allowed the case to proceed as if LeBlanc and Ossen also sued JRD.
JRD moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court granted this motion because it found that the Hudson
River, at the site of the accident, was not navigable in fact, and, thus, the
court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the lawsuit. LeBlanc and Ossen
then filed this appeal.

